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- Abstract - 
Theories of Emotion: 
Integrating philosophy and the social sciences 
By: Michael Stolzle 
 
 
The study of emotion is being taken on by many different fields of research. In particular, the 
social sciences are providing many new areas of development within the field. Philosophy is 
specially equipped to add to the research on human affective experience by synthesizing the 
many different fields’ work on emotion and providing a critical assessment of the current 
research. Two primary approaches to understanding emotion are (1) viewing emotion as a 
product of evolution and (2) viewing emotion as a product of social and cultural interaction. I 
argue, however, that while each of these approaches accurately explains a particular aspect of 
affective experience, they should work towards a more compatibilistic theory of emotion which 
views affective experience as a system that includes both evolutionary and socio-cultural 
influences. The concept of a looping effect is particularly helpful in illustrating the systemic 
nature of emotion, and I put forward the concept of a looping effect as a way to assess a theory’s 
ability to incorporate the two distinct aspects of affective experience (i.e., evolutionary 
psychology and social constructionism and their debate over the role cognitive and non-cognitive 
processes play in affective experience) which traditionally have been opposed to each other in 
the effort to present a clear theory of emotion.
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1. Introduction 
 
The philosophical effort to understand human emotion begins through introspective 
investigation as awareness of emotion’s impact on experience grows. As part of the human condition, 
an agent’s first hand experience is confined by the boundaries of their person (i.e., the agent’s 
physical and mental isolation entails certain epistemic boundaries which the agent cannot escape).1 
Each agent has the unique experience of perceiving his or her emotional responses, but sympathetic 
and empathetic experiences provide a window into other agents’ affective experience.2 However, 
there is disagreement within the social sciences regarding how best to explain the existence of 
affective experiences like sympathy and empathy, and how to conceptualize the range of emotional 
experiences had by humans.  
On the one hand, evolutionary psychology understands emotions as being derived from a 
universal set of evolved hardware that is common to all humans. In this way, emotion is construed as 
an attribute of human experience that can involve non-cognitive and/or cognitive processes that are 
developed over millennia through the process of evolution. On the other hand, social constructionist 
theories of emotion focus on the unique social dimensions of affective experience and hold that a full 
understanding of humans’ affective experiences requires an account of the social influences which 
establish and influence the development and experience of an agent’s emotions. These culturally-
conditioned features are conceived as being localized to an agent’s culture and thus social 
constructionist accounts of emotion can be contrasted with evolutionary psychologists’ universal 
                                                 
1
  Andy Clark and others, suggest a unique conception of externalism which challenges the traditional ideas of 
epistemic boundaries that I have just mentioned. By Clark’s “extended minds” account, our minds engage in 
active externalism; active externalism is a phenomenon in which our minds actually extend into the environments 
around us in order to actively manipulate and participate in producing our perceptions of the external world (Clark 
and Chalmers 1998). For example, when a person mentally imagines manipulating a large couch through a 
doorway, that person is actually extending their mind into the external world and, thus, “epistemic action demands 
epistemic credit” (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Cognitive processes are not restricted to going on within a person’s 
head. 
 
2
  Emotional sympathy is defined as an agent’s ability to understand another agent’s affective experience. Emotional 
empathy, in contrast, is an agent’s ability to personally feel another agent’s affective experience. See the word 
listings in the “Works Cited” section for more information. 
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conception of human emotion because social constructionism finds affective experience to be 
structured by the unique affective ecology3 of one’s culture.  
An examination of the existence of the human ability to sympathize and empathize highlights 
the differences between social constructionists’ and evolutionary psychologists’ approaches to 
explaining these affective phenomena; where the evolutionary psychologists’ framework views the 
capacity for sympathetic and empathetic experiences as something that has been naturally selected 
for due to its beneficial role in survival and reproduction, the social constructionist framework rejects 
this sort of approach as reductionist and gives primacy to social forces in its attempt at explaining the 
existence of these affective processes. While the social constructionist’s approach can appreciate on 
some levels the influences of evolutionary forces such as natural selection, its distinguishing 
characteristic is its emphasis on understanding emotions through particular social and cultural forces, 
and not merely evolutionary ones. In spite of the differences between accounts based on evolutionary 
psychology and those based on social constructionism, I maintain that the tension between the 
various theories of emotion finds a resolution in compatibilist theories.  
In this Thesis, I provide an investigation of three of the main camps of the debate pertaining 
to the understanding of affective experience: (1) The non-cognitivist theories that consider affective 
processes to be essentially lower-order processes, (2) The social constructionist theories that put 
forward philosophical theorizing and detailed anthropological studies to show that emotion cannot 
fully be understood as a basic non-cognitive function because of the impact cultural forces have on 
affective experience, and (3) The compatibilist theories which combine characteristics of both of the 
previous frameworks and hold that affective experience is constituted by a complex interaction 
between both lower and higher-order processes. To illustrate the explanatory power of 
compatibilism, I develop an example inspired by philosopher of science Ian Hacking’s “looping 
                                                 
3
  The term “ecology” is used here in reference to the intricate interactions among the natural and social worlds 
which synthesize into an experience which distinctly influences that agent’s affective development and 
experience. 
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effect of human kinds”. I argue that compatibilist theories are best equipped to explain emotion 
through the concept of looping effects and that for a theory of emotion to be robust it must be able to 
account for the empirically informed conception of the looping effect of human affective experience. 
 
2. The Problem and Layout: 
 
This Thesis investigates the contrasting frameworks of three social-scientific disciplines in 
order to both detail the tension among the explanatory stories that each perspective puts forward, and 
to help to lay the groundwork for a solution to the explanatory problem that synthesizes features of 
each perspective. Important questions for philosophy remain, however: (1) Does one these social 
science frameworks offer a more effective and complete theory of emotion from which to establish a 
philosophical investigation into emotion? (2) Or do each of the two contrasting frameworks provide a 
unique, yet partial, perspective that philosophy could beneficially combine into a compatibilist theory 
of emotion? And even if preserving some sort of hybrid theory is plausible, (3) Why would such a 
theory be preferable to handling two independent social-science frameworks of emotion? 
The relationship between consciousness and its role in both cognitive and non-cognitive 
theories is a highly debated topic. The debate has not yet been settled among the social scientists and 
philosophers involved in developing theories of emotion. I do not propose a solution to this debate 
but, for the purpose of clarity, I will characterize the relationship between social constructionism and 
evolutionary psychology and the role that each allows consciousness to play in their theories. It is 
critical to highlight the distinction between the two theories’ treatment of consciousness, for this 
distinction helps to make clear why the differences between these two theories are differences that 
are theoretically significant. 
 While cognitive processes are often associated with conscious processes that involve active 
mental cognition, not all cognitive processes involve an agent deliberately taking active part in the 
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mental process. That is to say that for a process to be considered cognitive it need not be a conscious 
one and vice versa; the terms cognitive and conscious are not synonymous. In many cases, a process 
is considered conscious if it has been associated with a conscious process at some previous time. For 
example, the process of learning to read is a highly conscious activity that involves developing a 
comprehension of the way letters, words, and sentences all fit together in order to communicate ideas 
to the reader. However, as an agent comes to be fully literate, the process of associating certain 
letters, words, and sentences with specific ideas becomes non-conscious in many cases. This is the 
case, for instance, when an agent perceives the letters p-i-z-z-a on a thin rectangular box and 
unconsciously and immediately makes multiple associations between the letters they have perceived, 
the shape of the box, and the meanings conveyed by the letters on the object before them. At one 
time, the process just described could have been a cognitively demanding activity of attempting to 
associate the letters on the box with a specific word meaning or idea. However, while this process 
may have once required a conscious effort on the part of the agent, the conscious aspects of this 
process are no longer required to fully appreciate the basic meanings of the letters/word on the box.4 
Both cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories allow for non-conscious emotional processes. 
Cognitivist theories, like social constructionism, allow for social forces to influence affective 
experience through habituated, non-conscious processes. In contrast, non-cognitivist theories, like 
evolutionary psychology, allow for evolutionary forces to influence affective experience through the 
natural selection of particular traits which improve a species’ survival and reproductive abilities. 
However, the way in which each theory understands how the level of consciousness is reduced over 
time in an agent’s affective processes, such as in the development of literacy discussed above, is 
related to the distinction between the differing roles consciousness plays in affective experience from 
the cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of emotion.  
                                                 
4
 Thank you to Amy Coplan for providing the inspiration for this example. 
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I categorize social constructionist theories into the cognitivist camp of theories of emotion 
because they assign a much greater, more direct, and more active role to consciousness in affective 
experience than non-cognitivist theories such as those put forward by evolutionary psychology. In 
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s famous theory of acquired traits, for example, Lamarck theorizes that 
characteristics acquired by an animal over time can be passed down to that animal’s offspring. 
Lamarck posits that the giraffe’s elongated neck, for example, is an adaptation developed over the 
many years in which generation after generation of giraffes were forced to stretch out their necks in 
order to reach food sources at the tops of the trees around them (Weinert, 2009: 104). The necks of 
giraffes are elongated over each animal’s life time and then that trait for an elongated neck is passed 
on to the giraffe’s posterity. The Lamarckian theory of the acquisition of characteristics was refuted 
long ago, but the example stands as one of science’s early attempts to connect an animal’s traits with 
the behaviors essential to its survival strategies. This relates to the contemporary evolutionary 
psychologists’ move to explain the development of particular affective experiences as being selected 
for by natural processes. That is, the evolutionary development of affective experience, along with all 
of the other genetic characteristics of a species, are passed down to offspring when the genes that 
allow for a particular affective experience (e.g., disgust) are associated with particular scenarios, like 
encountering the abject scene of a mutilated carcass, because the genes improve the members of that 
species’ survival. Larmarkianism and contemporary evolutionary psychology are two examples of 
frameworks which emphasize the role non-cognitive processes play in the development of traits in a 
species whether those traits are physical or emotional. 
Social constructionism, by my account, is classified as a cognitive account. This is because it 
views the process through which affective experiences are developed within Homo sapiens as more 
cognitive than that of the non-cognitive evolutionary process theorized by evolutionary psychology 
explained above. The process of acquiring specific affective traits, by the social constructionist’s 
account, involves the transmission of a given emotion from one generation to the next through a 
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process of social influences and habituation. As was discussed with the literacy example above, 
affective processes need not be cognitive ones. However, the process of acquiring a trait via social 
influences and habituation typically requires that an agent’s cognitive faculties play a more integral 
role in the habituation of an affective experience. For example, habituation of disgust towards an 
abject scene, from a social constructionist’s perspective, is engendered via social upbringing and 
cultural experiences that teach members of a social group to associate negative feelings, like fear, 
towards scenes that that group considers abject. These socially engendered tendencies to experience 
certain emotions in response to a particular scenario may indeed share a commonality with 
evolutionary theory in that an agent’s reproductive fitness can be influenced by their standing within 
a social group5. The distinguishing aspect of the social constructionist’s theory, though, is the story it 
tells of the origin for the development and transmission of affective experience which is based in the 
cognitive human faculties associated with humans’ social interactions.  
In this work, I contend that a compatibilist theory of emotion is indeed superior and that it 
provides the best foundation from which to establish a philosophy of emotion. This is because a 
hybrid theory of emotion combines the best features of each contrasting theory’s conceptualizations 
of emotion and also overcomes the disadvantages that are evident in each framework taken on its 
own. To defend this thesis, I begin with a discussion of some of the most recent theories of emotion 
put forward by philosophers embracing non-cognitive theories (section 3). I focus in particular on the 
work of Jesse Prinz, as he develops his theory of emotion as a bodily response on the basis of a vast 
array of historical and contemporary social science research and cognitive neuroscience (section 
3.1.1).6 After presenting Prinz’s non-cognitive theory of emotion, I offer a discussion of the 
methodology taken up by this school of thought (section 3.1.2). More specifically, I present a 
descriptive account of what non-cognitive theorists accept as data and how their framework utilizes 
                                                 
5
  This notion is central to this Thesis and will be discussed in greater detail in section 5. 
6
  Prinz’s account of emotion is influenced by the theory of emotion famously developed by William James. 
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that data in constructing and reinforcing their theory. In the next subsection, I present Catherine 
Lutz’s social constructionist theory of emotion (section 3.2.1). Built upon her study of the affective 
culture of the Ifaluk people of the Ifaluk atoll found in the Caroline Islands of the North Pacific, 
Lutz’s theory challenges evolutionary psychology’s framework. Immediately following the 
presentation of the social constructionist’s theories of emotion, I discuss the methodologies of this 
framework (section 3.2.2). Finally, I present a compatibilist theory of emotion through a discussion 
of the works of Jenefer Robinson and Martha Nussbaum (section 3.3). Robinson’s and Nussbaum’s 
respective work on emotion present theories that make room for aspects of both the cognitive and 
non-cognitive facets of affective experience. As is the case in section 3.1.2 and 3.2.2, I discuss the 
methodological commitments of more compatibilist theories like Robinson’s and Nussbaum’s 
(section 3.3.3). 
After surveying the various theories of emotion under consideration in this work, I discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of each theory (section 4) by referencing the characterizations of 
each theory’s methodological approaches as presented in the previous sections. Next, I argue that the 
methodological characteristics of the reductionist7 theories of emotion (i.e., social constructionism 
and evolutionary psychology) each correctly portray part of the story of emotion. However, neither 
provides a complete picture of emotion based upon the current body of research on emotion from the 
social sciences.  
While Robinson and Nussbaum suggest theories that are more compatibilist than the ones 
proffered by the reductionists, I argue that the move towards compatibilism should be taken one step 
further. Thus, I introduce Ian Hacking’s theorization of “looping effects of human kinds” (1995: 21), 
a theory that holds that people’s cultural beliefs about themselves influence both their physical and 
mental development. I offer a conceptualization of the looping effect theory which holds that 
                                                 
7
 Throughout this paper the term “reductionist” is used to refer to theories which reduce the base of affective 
experience to a single source (e.g., a bodily response). The term is not used in a way common in the philosophy of 
science and the philosophy of mind wherein the term commonly refers to a type of materialism. 
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evolutionary and social forces influence each other and in turn create a feedback loop which 
influences, among other things, the affective experiences of the people of a given society. I offer 
support for my theory by drawing on various social scientific investigations which illustrate the 
reality of the looping effect’s influence on affective experience (section 5). 
Lastly, having argued for the superiority of a compatibilist theory of emotion in the preceding 
sections, I conclude with a brief summary and discussion of the major facets of my project (section 
6). 
 
3. Theories of Emotion 
 
3.1 Non-cognitivism – Jesse Prinz 
3.1.1 Prinz – Gut Reactions 
Prinz’s theory of emotion is Neo-Jamesian in that Prinz endorses the idea that our bodies 
instinctively react to stimuli. Emotions are one way in which our bodies do this, via an agent’s 
autonomic responses to changes in his or her physiological states. Although he emphasizes 
instinctive affective responses, Prinz also acknowledges that there is a class of complex emotions 
which involve cognitive processes. In Gut Reactions he argues that while emotions essentially are a 
type of perception that increases our reproductive fitness and have been evolutionarily developed due 
to their positive influence on the survival of ancient ancestors and, “most emotions experienced in 
adult human life bear the influence of culture” (2004: 158). However, the recognition that culture 
plays a role in affective experience does not move Prinz’s theory into compatibilism (section 3.4); 
rather, Prinz’s theory utilizes the concept of valence8 as the mode of cognitive and social influence 
over emotion. 
                                                 
8
  Valence, in regards to theories of emotion, is the idea that negative and/or positive inklings can be attached to any 
given affective experience (Prinz 2004: 167). Prinz also notes that the terms ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ are rather 
uninformative, and adds the qualification that his use of the terms refers to negatively reinforcing and positively 
reinforcing affective experiences (2004: 175). 
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Referencing William James’s theory of emotion, Prinz explains that unique to the non-
cognitive account of emotion is the notion that emotions can be understood as embodied appraisals 
which are directly excited by certain stimuli. The stimuli that initially arouse a given emotion are 
thought to lead directly and immediately to the associated physiological state. Thus, while it is 
allowed that cognitive appraisals can have a secondary influence on affective experience, the primary 
affective response is a bodily one. The higher order influence on affective experience is explained by 
Prinz’s valence theory. Through valence theory, Prinz holds that gut reactions regularly occur, but 
says that without valence they would have no particular negative or positive influence on our 
affective experience: 
Fear, for example, represents danger, but it does not represent the fact that danger is 
something that is undesirable. One can imagine being indifferent to danger…That is where 
valence markers come in. When one couples an embodied fear appraisal with a state that 
serves as a negative reinforcer, one represents the fact that the situation inducing fear matters 
(2004: 178). 
 
From this Prinz’s theory may seem, prima facie, compatibilist, in that it allows for both lower order 
and higher order aspects to be involved in affective experience. However, Prinz’s valence theory is 
part of a very early phase within the process of affective experience. While the valence of a particular 
perception may in some ways be determined by cultural influences, the influence of valence on 
affective experience does not occur through the higher order processing theorized by Robinson and 
Nussbaum (section 3.4). True Compatibilism, as I understand it, entails a conceptualization of the 
role one’s cognitive faculties play in affective experience. It is not enough to say that one’s bodily 
states can be tinged with certain positive or negative inklings. That is to say that Prinz acknowledges 
the influence of evolutionary and social forces on an agent’s affective experience, however because 
these forces do not necessarily incorporate any conscious assessment of experience, Prinz’s theory 
does not fall into the compatibilist category as I have defined it. Prinz’s theory relies upon the fact 
that an affective response can be “learned” through social conditioning and does not entail that the 
affective response is cognitively mediated. Once an association is established and internalized by a 
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given agent the affective response can occur automatically and without any cognitive evaluation. For 
this reason, again, I defined Prinz’s theory as essentially non-cognitive. 
3.1.2 Discussion of the Methodological Characteristics of Evolutionary Psychology 
The example of startle and reflex responses are commonly used to illustrate the ways in which 
emotions can be characterized as bodily responses. Indeed, the title of Prinz’s book, Gut Reactions, 
alludes to the notion that his theory provides an account of emotion that bases the foundations of an 
agent’s initial affective experience within the processes hardwired into her bodily perceptions. 
Imagine an agent walking quietly down a grassy path through a heavily wooded area on a lazy 
afternoon in May. As the agent rounds a bend in the path, she is startled by a dark, thin, S-shaped 
figure on the ground near her foot. The initial startle reaction of the agent is said to be non-cognitive 
because the perception of the figure initially bypasses the agent’s cognitive processes in order to first 
ensure her safety and then allows her to cognitively assess the situation further. Regardless of 
whether or not the S-shaped figure turns out to be a snake or a twig, the agent’s startle-based fear 
reaction is excited without the need for a cognitive assessment to determine the reality of the 
situation. Thus, from the non-cognitivist’s perspective, any initial twinge of fear the agent 
experiences as part of the initial startle response (prior to her cognitive capacities assessing the 
situation) is held to be a primary way in which emotion can be defined as a bodily, non-cognitive 
response because the agent’s body initializes the affective state prior to cognitive assessment. A 
similar instance of the body’s ability to cause emotional and physical reactions prior to an agent’s 
cognitive processes taking place among the agent’s various processes is when an agent is 
unexpectedly burned.  
The thought of accidentally being burned by unintentionally touching an incredibly hot pan 
arouses a sense of discomfort and sympathetic pain in many people. The emotions associated with 
merely imagining such an event are clearly cognitive in that they do not initially incorporate any 
bodily processes; anyone who has experienced a placebo effect can tell you, just because an 
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imaginary scene is wrapped up in cognitive processes, does not entail that the body cannot play a 
subsequent role in the agent’s actual physical experience. However, the action of being unexpectedly 
burned by a hot pan involves a bodily response that comes prior to any cognitive processes. This is so 
because reflex actions, like the one involved in an agent’s jerking her hand away from a hot pan, 
occur through a bodily process that is entirely separate from the mind’s cognitive ones. That is, the 
spinal column contains neural circuits which immediately process emergency signals and initiate 
autonomic, reflexive responses before sending the message on to the brain for further cognitive 
assessment. According to evolutionary theory, it is likely that this type of autonomic information 
filtering in creatures capable of both reflexive and cognitive reactions survives due to the autonomic 
trait’s ability to ensure those creatures’ survival by removing them from any initial danger and saving 
them precious time before the cognitive processes are able to take up the task of further filtering the 
information. Although an autonomic system of this sort could potentially yield false positives in the 
face of a perceived danger, the body seems to be operating with a “better safe than sorry” system. 
 Examples such as these aid in clarifying the non-cognitivist theories of emotion proffered by 
evolutionary psychologists because they provide instances in which it is clear that certain bodily 
responses are capable of influencing an agent’s affective state prior to the agent’s cognitive processes 
influencing her affective state as well. In the case of reflexive startle reactions to the snake-like S-
shaped figure, the agent’s initial affective state of fear is seemingly initialized by non-cognitive 
facets of the agent’s affective processes. Similarly, an agent’s initial reflex to quickly remove her 
hand from an intensely hot heat source has been shown to be entirely governed by the neural 
emergency information processing circuits of the spinal column. Evolutionary psychology’s 
approach to explaining the existence of emotion is intimately wrapped up in the basic story that it 
tells for the existence of any creature’s processes: that any process which increases both a living 
thing’s chances of survival and its ability to reproduce effectively is likely to be selected for by 
natural selection and thus propagated among subsequent generations via the transmission of genes 
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from generation to generation. Thus, the explanation of the existence of reflexive systems of reaction 
(as with being burned) and emotion (as with perceiving a possibly dangerous figure) essentially is 
based in an agent’s being born with a genetic code that has been honed by natural selection to allow 
such reactions and reflexive, affective experiences to occur.  
Restricting a theory’s explanatory power to discovering the ways in which a trait may have 
been passed down through generations of life via gene transmission eliminates this theoretical 
framework’s ability to fully appreciate the unique nature and influence of social interaction. Where 
an agent may be genetically predisposed to associate fear with the perception of snake-like figures, 
the work of Michael Cook and Susan Mineka (1990) suggests that the fear of snakes is not innate; 
rather it is a socially conditioned response. An agent’s fear response to snakes and snake-like figures 
is developed through an agent’s observation of others’ aggravated reactions to snake-like figures 
(Cook & Mineka 1990: 386). Additionally, in favor of the evolutionary psychologist’s camp, Cook 
and Mineka’s results suggest that the salience of an object influences the rate at which an agent can 
be conditioned with a particular affective response to that object (1990: 386).  
Cook’s and Mineka’s research has shown that it requires a less rigorous process of 
conditioning to establish a fear response in Rhesus monkeys toward any snake-like figure than to 
establish a fear response in the test subjects toward a flower-like figure (1990: 386). These results are 
both helpful and burdensome to evolutionary psychology’s method of inquiry and explanation 
because Cook’s and Mineka’s research has revealed that while no particular associations between 
fear and snake-like figures exist innately, agents are predisposed to make associations between these 
snake-like figures and their own fear-based emotions. This facet of the research supports the 
evolutionary psychologists’ efforts in that it provides them with evidence of natural selection’s 
influence on shaping our dispositions for certain affective experiences in association with particular 
events and perceptions. Nevertheless, Cook’s and Mineka’s work burdens the theories of emotion 
from the evolutionary psychologists’ camp by also revealing the role that social interactions play in 
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shaping and influencing agents’ affective experiences. The subjects of Cook’s and Mineka’s study 
may have had a genetically driven predisposition which supported the development of an aversion 
toward snake-like figures but this aversion is not realized without the social influences of a subject 
observing the association of a discriminatory aversion toward snake-like figures in others. 
Evolutionary psychology’s theories of emotion are established, through a methodology which 
investigates the role selective forces play in establishing the affective experiences we know in 
ourselves and observe in the world around us. So, while evolutionary psychology is not exempt from 
incorporating some appreciation of the role social forces play in shaping affective experience, its 
explanatory ability to incorporate these social forces into its theories is hindered because of its 
methodological focus on the non-cognitive aspects of human affective experience.9 
Prinz considers theories of emotion from evolutionary psychology to be reductionist in that 
they reduce their explanation of affective experience to its most basic part. Referencing the work of 
Darwin and Paul Ekman, among others, Prinz explains that the biological aspect of affective 
experience is only half of the story (2004: 113). Evolutionary psychology seeks “to support 
innateness claims…by developing intuitively plausible stories about the adaptive functions of various 
states and traits” (2004: 117-118). Exceedingly reductionist, evolutionary psychologists even go so 
far as to hold that even higher-order cognitive emotions are the product of natural selection. Prinz 
works to separate his theory from this lot. He explains that although the work of Ekman and others is 
indebted to evolutionary psychology because it suggests that members of the human species have 
shared physiological and genetic factors, “this evidence does not show that the emotions we have 
names for in English exist in all cultures” (2004: 129). In some instances, then, particular emotions 
can be culturally unique affective experiences which cannot be identified as universally shared 
                                                 
9
  This topic is addressed in further detail in both sections 3.4 and 4.0 
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affective experiences.10 In this way, Prinz criticizes the reductionist theory of emotion on the grounds 
that it relies too heavily on inferences that fall victim to the epistemic uncertainty entailed in a theory 
based upon the ways in which natural selection has guided our affective experiences over millions of 
years to those that we experience today. For example, when evolutionary psychologists observe 
affective experience in the world today, they infer that the continued occurrence of that emotion is 
based on the role the emotion played in the species’ survival. While this theory can provide plausible 
explanations for why a given affective experience occurs in a species, the nature of this inference 
renders its explanations post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
Prinz supports his valence theory with research in the cognitive neurosciences. In particular, 
Prinz relies upon empirical studies on the neural architecture of emotions to support his claims 
regarding valence. For instance, Prinz compares several neurological studies which support the claim 
that emotions seem to have two distinctive parts (2004: 162-163).11 The brain scans taken in these 
studies show that a particular affective experience can be associated with separate areas of the brain 
that are each associated with positive or negative valences, and other areas typically associated with a 
particular bodily profile. Thus, Prinz argues that this lends support to his valence theory because the 
various affective responses in these studies each are subserved by processes that take place in 
separate areas of the brain and each of these areas are known to be associated with valence and 
bodily feedback (2004: 165).  
From this basic overview of Prinz’s argument for his valence theory, it can be seen that his 
version of non-cognitivism relies heavily upon cognitive neuroscience. That is, the crux of Prinz’s 
valence theory is most strongly supported by his reference to empirical studies of the brain’s form 
                                                 
10
  Prinz offers, for example, that “some researchers believe that emotions such as gezelligheid, amae, song, and 
patriotism are unique to particular cultures” (2004: 131). 
 
11
 Various studies have been unable to agree upon the “exact anatomical substrates of negative and positive 
valence,” Prinz admits (2004: 162). However, regardless of these discrepancies, all of the results suggest that 
positive and negative valence involve distinct structures. For more on these studies, see Davidson, 1992; Sutton & 
Davidson, 1997; Northoff et al., 2000. 
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and function, and the ways in which his theory can be linked to how the average human brain has 
been found to react to and process emotion. In this way, while not strictly reductionist, Prinz’s 
valence theory seems to be in line with the goal of evolutionary psychology which is to explain 
affective experience as being founded upon universally shared human traits. 
3.2 Social Constructionist Theories of Emotion 
3.2.1 Lutz – Unnatural Emotions 
Social constructionist accounts of emotion aim at explaining various affective phenomena by 
appealing to a given society’s cultural influences and values. Social structure, for the social 
constructionist, provides the foundation from which a given society’s range of emotional responses 
can be understood and explained. Catherine Lutz, an ethnopsychologist, explains: 
To understand the meaning of an emotion word is to be able to envisage (and perhaps 
to find oneself able to participate in) a complicated scene with actors, actions, 
interpersonal relationships in a particular state of repair, moral points of view, facial 
expressions, personal and social goods, and sequences of events (1998: 10). 
 
While Lutz’s social constructionist understanding of emotion holds that true understanding of a given 
emotion from a given culture requires complete understanding of the intricate network of social 
identity that comprises that society, it does not deny that non-conscious processes have the ability to 
influence the formation and understanding of emotion in a given culture. Given a broad 
understanding of social construction, perhaps social construction need not defend a culturally-local 
conception of emotions. Instead, social construction could accommodate certain compatibilist ideas 
and allow room for an accurate understanding of non-cognitive social processes. This would allow 
for some universality to be incorporated in the social constructionist’s conception of emotion from an 
evolutionary perspective. 
The social constructionist’s understanding of emotion is not necessarily based solely upon 
cognitive processes. In point of fact, many of the socially constructed aspects of emotion show some 
level of compatibility with being conceptualized as non-cognitive processes. The distinction being 
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made by relating social constructionists with cognitive theories of emotion, however, is aimed at 
illustrating their principal contrast with evolutionary psychologists. While appraisal theories of 
emotion like evolutionary psychology can account for the role non-cognitive processes play in 
emotion, they also emphasize the influence of social interaction, which develops through a given 
agent’s higher-order processes and does not remain founded solely upon that agent’s lower, pre-
reflective processes.12 
 My initial distinction between social constructionism and evolutionary psychology aims at 
highlighting a shortcoming of evolutionary psychology’s efforts to understand emotion on a strictly 
pre-reflective level. That is that evolutionary psychology and the strictly non-cognitive approach to 
understanding emotion do not give sufficient attention to the influence of higher-level processes that 
immediately impact affective experience. As Prinz puts it: 
According to defenders of cognitive theories, emotions depend on propositional attitudes. 
These are construed as structured, concept-laden mental representations that are not identical 
to the somatic states associated with our emotions (2004: 242). 
 
Lutz’s theory of social constructionism is related to the previous statement from Prinz in that it holds 
that a given agent’s primary affective experience is too bound by social forces to be accurately 
conceptualized on any more foundational levels (e.g., evolutionary or biological levels). In her own 
words, Lutz concludes that:  
The evidence presented [in her work entitled Unnatural Emotions] can be used to suggest 
that emotion experience, both in the West and on Ifaluk, is more aptly viewed as the outcome 
of social relations and their corollary worldviews than as universal psychobiological entities 
(1998: 209). 
 
Thus, affective experience is understood by Lutz as a socially constructed, culturally local entity 
which can truly be understood only as something completely integrated into a given society. A theory 
of emotion, for the social constructionist, provides an account of the cognitive processes which does 
not consider the essential components of affective experience to be lower-order processes. 
                                                 
12
 Appraisal theories of emotion are a class of theory which holds that emotion primarily is a bodily appraisal (e.g., 
see the discussion of William James’s theory of emotion on page 11). 
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3.2.2 Discussion of the Methodological Characteristics of Social Constructionism 
Lutz’s theories are based heavily upon the branch of anthropology known as ethnography, “the 
scientific description of nations or races of men with their customs, habits, and points of difference” 
(Ethnography, Oxford English Dictionary). For instance, Lutz references the work of 
ethnopsychologist Roy D’Andrade, which emphasizes cognitive processing. Consider the diagram 
below, which is taken from D’Andrade’s influential work and shows an agent’s initial perceptions 
being processed only after the agent engages in some level of cognitive processing: 13 
 
In line with social constructionist theories which I discussed in section 3.2.1, D’Andrade emphasizes 
that perceptions are filtered through cognitive processes prior to generating affective experience. 
Take the affective experience of fear for example. As an agent walks out of Liberty Hall after a 
midnight showing of her favorite film, she begins to make her way to her car parked in a lot at the 
end of a dark alley. Never mind the fact that the agent is already tense with anticipation of an 
encounter in the seedy alleyway, she is startled by a shifting shadow as she passes by a dumpster 
half-way to her car. The agent has just experienced an instance labeled in D’Andrade’s diagram as 
the “event”. The agent perceives, in immediate conjunction with the event, the shadow shifting and 
her mind immediately processes the perception through her cognitive capacity for what D’Andrade 
                                                 
13
 Image from: http://www.anth.uconn.edu/faculty/dandrade/ 
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labels as “thought” (refer to the diagram above). This thought process, as was discussed in detail in 
section 2, need not be a conscious thought at this stage in the affective chain of events. Rather, the 
initial thoughts involved in the processing of the agent’s startle event go on to either stimulate a non-
cognitive reflex action and reflexive affective experience or a cognitive assessment of the perceived 
event. The characteristic cognitive aspect of this model of affective processes is that thought rather 
than a reflexive bodily response comes first. Thus, with reference to D’Andrade Lutz provides 
evidence from the social science of ethnopsychology, that supports her notion that affective 
experience is a type cognitive process influenced by culture, and cannot be effectively understood as 
a non-cognitive process alone (1998: 94-95). 
 The works of animal and human behaviorists (e.g., Paul Ekman) prove to be a battleground 
between the social constructionists and evolutionary psychologists. Where the tendency to 
universalize the human experience of emotion is characteristic of the non-cognitive camp, social 
constructionists critique the generalizing work of Ekman and others. Specifically, Lutz states: 
[While] cross-cultural accounts [of emotion] have been presented traditionally as natural 
rather than cultural events (i.e., as scientific discoveries rather than historical products), they 
have made use of concepts taken wholesale from the lay emotion language of the West 
(1998: 217).  
 
Although much of the research and discussion surrounding Ekman’s results is biased according to 
Lutz, she acknowledges that many Twentieth-century anthropologists have had to work to eliminate 
their own cultural biases. However, Lutz holds that a Universalist theory of emotion, like that of 
Ekman, is lacking because it 
[O]nly succeeds in pushing the cultural perspective of the anthropologist ‘underground, into 
the subconscious,’ with the result that anthropologists then simply ‘project their intuitive 
understanding…onto a presumed universal structural framework of human thought’ (Leacock 
and Nash 1977: 642) 
(Lutz 1998: 221).  
 
Lutz acknowledges that if such an accusation is to hold, it must also hold for the social 
constructionist because one’s ideas, language, culture, etc. confine the ways one can explain the 
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theories one puts forward. In conclusion, then, Lutz offers that “[r]eflection on what exactly those 
ideas are…can help to mitigate the effect of their use by removing them from exclusive residence in 
the realm of the natural…into that of the cultural and historical” (1998: 225). Thus, awareness and 
discussion of our biases at least is one way to account for the influences of those biases and provide 
ourselves with the opportunity to counteract them. 
 The work of evolutionary psychologists, however, is not necessarily doomed to an inevitably 
biased perspective due to a refusal to pay adequate attention to the role that one’s cultural ideals and 
beliefs play in the formulation of theories. In fact, those more inclined to evolutionary accounts are 
required to account for the possibility of biases influencing the development of a theory, just as are 
all of those who work to develop other robust scientific theories. The methodologies of a given 
discipline, however, can play an important role in identifying the biases present in a given school of 
thought. For instance, as Lutz explains in the quote above, social constructionists’ focus on 
understanding the role that social and cultural forces have on a people predisposes the discipline to 
consider the ways in which contemporary social and cultural forces could manipulate the researchers’ 
own theories and beliefs. In contrast, evolutionary psychologists focus is on the role that biological 
forces of natural selection play in influencing a given people’s affective experience. The nature of 
this approach has the potential to bias the discipline’s theorizing away from considerations of the 
theorists’ own cultural biases altogether if they perceive that their own cultural beliefs have nothing 
to do with the evolutionary processes of pre-history.14 
 In a discussion of the way in which cultural values influence science, Lynn Hankinson 
Nelson and Alison Wylie discuss an instance in which contemporary cultural beliefs skew the results 
of a scholarly anthropological study (Kincaid, Dupré, and Wylie 2007: 65). They reference a study in 
which a researcher, Denise Donlon, critically reinterpreted data that suggested a prevalence of male 
specimens among a university’s collections (Donlon 1993). In her study, Donlon found that the 
                                                 
14
 This consideration is discussed in further detail with an example in section 5. 
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skewed sex ratios reported by a previous study were inaccurate and “most plausibly reflect 
systematic errors in sex identification due to reliance on measures of ‘robustness’ that presuppose 
ethnocentric stereotypes of physical dimorphism” (Kincaid, Dupré, and Wylie: 2007: 65). Physical 
dimorphism refers to a notable physical difference between males and females. Across many cultures 
male skeletal remains have been found to be, on average, larger than female skeletal remains. This 
commonality was only one of the assumptions which misled the researchers critiqued by Donlon. 
However, a deeper prejudice was found to have biased the researchers’ work. The deeper prejudice 
was from researchers’ assumption that ancient peoples’ skeletons exhibit sexual dimorphisms in a 
way similar to the sexual dimorphism of people’s skeletal structures observed today (i.e., 
contemporary human male skeletons are generally larger than contemporary human female ones). 
Donlon found that many of the skeletons from the collection were erroneously labeled as male, 
which suggests that the original researchers’ work had been biased by certain of their own cultural 
beliefs. Additionally, Donlon’s research revealed that the common use of the “male as hunter” 
archetype should be reevaluated so that future anthropological work is not biased by this 
preconception of a history of humankind in which the men must be larger in order to effectively 
provide for their community while women are forced into roles which allow for the development of 
smaller skeletal frames. Donlon concludes that “it is a mistake to project onto prehistoric Aboriginal 
foragers the norms of gender-segregated physical activity that are conventional in sedentary, largely 
urban, middle-class contexts” (1993). 
 The work of Donlon is further supported by a study from Hetty Jo Brumbach and Robert 
Jarvenpa (1997). Brumbach and Jarvenpa successfully showed that the role of the women of the 
subarctic Dene people was primarily a hunting one. This data contradicts much of the Western 
world’s accepted definitions of male and female gender roles. This contradiction suggests that 
“archaeologists should reassess standard ascriptions of function to sites and artifacts where these 
depend on an identification of hunting activities with men, sharply segregated from the domestic 
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activities associated with women” (Kincaid, Dupré, and Wylie 2007: 67). The work done by feminist 
anthropologists like Donlon, Brumbach, and Jarvenpa provides evidence of the fact that even though 
anthropologists may be in a better position than evolutionary psychologists to critically assess their 
own cultural biases, social scientists are not as exempt from this issue as Lutz suggests. 
The research supporting Lutz’s theory of social constructionism is comprised almost entirely 
of data collected by anthropological studies. Lutz references countless ethnographic investigations, 
but does not attempt to give any meaningful account of the biologically based scientific studies of 
emotion which provide an understanding of emotion as a non-cognitive biological process. Rather, 
she suggests that Habermas’s 1971 establishment of “technical interest”, as a standard for how to 
determine what counts as knowledge, was the beginning of a movement that instilled a very 
controlled chain-reaction within the scientific community that resulted in emotions being viewed as 
vague, imprecise, unpredictable, and generally  disassociated from rational investigation (1998: 
220).15 However, Lutz’s thesis is an attempt to counter Habermas’s dismissal of emotions as too 
“disassociated with rational investigation”. Her project details many ways in which rational 
anthropological study can reveal the ways socially constructed values and ideas are an essential 
aspect of human affective experience. 
3.3 Compatibilist Theories – Jenefer Robinson and Martha Nussbaum 
3.3.1 Robinson – Deeper than Reason 
Robinson’s theory holds that emotions are processes, which begin as non-cognitive appraisals that 
arouse certain physiological states that in turn produce tendencies in human action, further appraisals, 
etc. Only secondarily do cognitive appraisals apply their influence to the human affective experience 
through the process of cognitive monitoring (2005: 3). And yet this emotion process, according to 
Robinson’s theory, must be taken as an entire unit that includes both the cognitive and non-cognitive 
                                                 
15
 For a contrasting view to Habermas’s, see Alison Jaggar’s article Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist 
Epistemology where she holds that emotions cannot and should not be removed from scientific investigations. 
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facets of emotion. In defining emotions as a process, Robinson argues that the process of affective 
experience is two-fold: First, there are non-cognitive perceptions, which are then followed by 
cognitive appraisals. While Robinson holds that for some emotions cognitive appraisal is only 
secondary, she is not advancing a non-cognitive theory of emotion. Instead, the process, for 
Robinson, is essential for understanding emotion. She allows that “gut reactions”16 seem indeed to be 
non-cognitive affective events; however, these instances comprise only part of the whole of affective 
experience. To reduce the understanding of emotion to the foundation of its bodily perception is to 
omit the vast array of human affective experience that is influenced, and/or dictated by the cognitive 
facets of the process. Even though Prinz differentiates himself from reductionist theories in Gut 
Reactions (see section 3.1.1), Robinson maintains that Prinz has only really provided a very clever 
and informed theory of gut reactions and has not provided an explanation of emotions proper (2007). 
As Robinson states, “it seems as if some kind of appraisal or evaluation is necessary for emotion and 
that we distinguish one emotion from another by reference to the different kinds of appraisal they 
require” (2005: 26).  
Robinson draws a great deal on the research of neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux. In particular, 
from LeDoux’s research, Robinson concludes that “an affective appraisal draws attention to 
something in the environment significant to me or mine and gets my body ready for appropriate 
action” (2005: 59). Thus, Robinson’s theory allows for a consideration of cognitive emotional 
responses that are excited entirely by cognitive stimuli, such as belief. Robinson summarizes her 
position with the statement that 
There are indeed affective appraisals that initiate the physiological and behavioural changes 
that we define as emotional. Further, even if it is a cognitively complex thought or belief that 
appears to trigger an emotional response, the response itself is the result of a rough and ready 
affective appraisal of that thought or belief, serving to direct attention to it and to prepare for 
appropriate action (2005: 70).  
 
                                                 
16
 a direct reference, made by Robinson, to Prinz’s work Gut Reactions, 2008 
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Prima facie, Robinson’s claim can be read as non-cognitive in that at the core of affective experience, 
lays a “rough and ready affective appraisal”. However, Robinson’s work differs from Prinz’s more 
non-cognitive framework because of the increased level to which she allows that cognitive processes 
play a role in human affective experience. Furthermore, for the purposes of this project, the focus is 
on the origin of those “rough and ready affective appraisals”. In a discussion of LeDoux’s research, 
Robinson qualifies her theory by endorsing LeDoux’s theory that there is a link between 
humankind’s ‘fundamental life tasks’ and the possible universality of certain basic emotions (2005: 
69). That is, certain basic emotions are indeed shared by all humans because of the role they have 
played in allowing members of the human species to successfully survive and reproduce. Granting 
the possibility that all human agents have a shared core of basic emotions on which their affective 
experiences are based, does not entail that those basic emotions have always been part of non-
cognitive, and unconscious evolutionary forces. Instead, a set of basic emotions might have become 
established over millennia of interplay between social and genetic forces.17 Thus, the primary role of 
cognitive processes in affective experience is as a monitoring and reappraisal pathway. Because of 
her emphasis on understanding the cognitive processes as an essential part of the affective 
experience along with the initial perception of physiological states, I have labeled Robinson’s theory 
a form of compatibilism. 
3.3.2 Nussbaum – Hiding from Humanity and Upheavals of Thought 
Evaluative judgments are a point at which social construction relates to cognitive theories of 
emotion. Martha Nussbaum, for one, makes this connection in her discussion of disgust in Hiding 
from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law: 
In many ways our social relations, too, are structured by the disgusting and our 
multifarious attempts to ward it off. Ways of dealing with repulsive animal 
substances such as feces, corpses, and rotten meat are pervasive sources of social 
custom (2004: 72). 
 
                                                 
17
 This notion will be detailed further in section 5. 
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With this, Nussbaum provides an illustration of Robert Solomon’s notion of the way an affective 
response provides a socially constructed lens through which to view the world. 
In Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Nussbaum suggests that “[t]o call an 
emotion cognitive does not, of course entail that it is either conscious or reflective” (2001: 115). This 
presents a conception of affective judgments which does not essentially entail a conscious appraisal 
of stimuli. Rather, for Nussbaum, affective appraisals can, and do, take place on a sub-conscious 
level. And so in Nussbaum’s appraisal theory of emotion, an account is given which establishes a 
nuanced conceptualization of conscious and physiological responses that understands them as 
reacting to affective stimuli on multiple levels of processing. 
Similar to Robinson’s theory above, Nussbaum’s theory is partly inspired by the work of 
neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux. LeDoux explains that, 
[the] establishment of memories is a function of the entire network, not just of one 
component. The amygdala is certainly crucial, but we must not lose sight of the fact that its 
functions exist only by virtue of the system to which it belongs (1994: 56).  
 
Given LeDoux’s conception of a network of functions being involved in the process of memory 
formation, Nussbaum conceives of affective judgments as part of a complex system that do not 
essentially entail a conscious appraisal of stimuli. Rather, for Nussbaum, affective appraisals can, and 
do, take place on a sub-conscious level. And so in Nussbaum’s appraisal theory of emotion, an 
account is given which addresses cognitive and physiological responses to affective stimuli. 
Emotions for Nussbaum become a hybrid of the cognitive and physiological: 
Once one has formed attachments to unstable things not fully under one’s control, once one 
has made these part of one’s notion of one’s flourishing, one has emotions of a background 
kind toward them—on my view, judgments that acknowledge their enormous worth—that 
persist in the fabric of one’s life, and are crucial to the explanation of one’s actions (2001: 
71). 
 
Thus, one’s affective experience is governed by the interaction between cognitive and non-cognitive 
processes which each play a role in one’s ability to integrate cognitive judgments to the extent that 
those judgments no longer need governance by their formative cognitive faculties and instead come 
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to “persist in the fabric of one’s life”. Nussbaum’s theory makes room for a definition of emotion 
which allows for both cognitive and non-cognitive facets on fundamental levels of humans’ affective 
experience. She, therefore, has been categorized as compatibilist. The concern initially expressed 
about the confounding lack of distinction between the conscious and unconscious aspects of 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism finds some resolution in Nussbaum’s theory—as is also the case in 
Robinson’s theory— however in section 5 a more in-depth way to clarify this distinction is 
presented.  
3.3.3 Discussion of the Methodological Characteristics of Compatibilist Theory 
Compatibilist theories of emotion contain features of cognitivism and non-cognitivism which appeal 
to both social scientific and biological investigations. From the philosophical side of the study of 
emotion, Robinson references Solomon, Nussbaum, William Lyons, etc., and from the social and 
cognitive sciences, she references Richard Lazarus, Ekman, Robert Zajonc and Antonio Damasio, 
among others. Providing a synthesis of the various realms of theorizing on emotion, Robinson’s work 
is founded upon the very old idea that there is a fundamental connection between emotion and bodily 
states which is a concept attributed to William James’s theory of emotion. However, Robinson 
develops her theory with the addition of more contemporary studies which have improved our 
understanding of the ways in which humans’ cognitive abilities are an integral aspect of our affective 
experiences. 
 Robinson finds that the social constructionists and the valence theorists are each using very 
focused data sets to understand a piece of the whole of affective experience. Robinson argues that 
there are indeed a small number of basic non-cognitive emotion systems, but that there is also a 
complex array of cognitive emotions that are initiated by non-cognitive appraisals (2005: 89). As 
Robinson states, “a cognitive evaluation alone cannot cause, much less be, an emotion”, however the 
orientation of an agent’s emotional experience is defined by the seemingly limitless combination of 
languages and cultures acting on that agent (2005: 90). 
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 In similar form, Nussbaum pulls from both schools of emotion theory. In Hiding from 
Humanity, she emphasizes the anthropological studies that help to explain the variation that occurs 
among the associated objects of various cultures’ feelings of disgust. However, in Upheavals of 
Thought, Nussbaum provides reference to both the Arts and Humanities as well as references from 
the social scientific literature in order to develop her own position. 
 
4. Discussion of the Arguments: Cognitivism’s and Non-Cognitivism’s Approach to 
Emotion Theory 
 
An example displays the ways each theory’s framework offers an informative perspective for 
analysis and also demonstrates each theory’s shortcomings. The aversion to abject and bloody scenes 
has been studied and contemplated both culturally and biologically for thousands of years. Plato’s 
Republic displays a scene in which this aversion is exhibited: 
Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North 
Wall when he saw some corpses lying at the executioner’s feet. He had an appetite to look at 
them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away. For a time he struggled with 
himself and covered his face, but, finally, overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes 
wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, 
take your fill of the beautiful sight!” (Bk IV, Ln 435-442). 
 
Plato’s notion of the 3-part soul comprised of reason (rationality), spirit (emotion), and appetite 
(desires) suggests that the ‘appetite’ that Leontius fell victim to was a process which could not be 
overcome by the rational and emotional facets of his being. Leontius’s actions demonstrate the 
existence of complex and conflicting processes involved with human experiences related to emotion 
in that Leontius’s reaction to the abject scene exhibits multiple layers of processes influencing each 
other. The non-cognitive theories of emotion share a similar vein of thought with their notion that 
bodily responses are the foundation of affective experience and in many cases simply are gut 
reactions. While the non-cognitive foundations of frameworks such as Prinz’s understand emotion as 
having a secondary cognitive component, the essential nature of human physiological responses in 
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affective experience make emotion a non-cognitive process. Primacy is given to the idea that 
emotions are composed of physiological appraisals and responses that make up affective experiences, 
and so from a non-cognitive perspective, Plato’s scene can be understood as demonstrating the 
foundational role that non-cognitive processes play in the affective experience of human beings. 
While Leontius was disgusted and urged by certain of his faculties to avert his eyes, there was no 
amount of conscious effort that could completely squelch his appetite to gaze upon the pile of 
corpses. The non-cognitive approach, thus, has the benefit of conceptualizing emotional responses on 
their most basic levels (e.g., the physiological level) and offering a straight-forward, reduced 
conceptualization of affective experience. However, the diminished role given to cognitive processes 
deprives non-cognitive theories of the ability to adequately account for the long term effects of social 
practices that play a formative role in physiological processes.  
 A second example will help to illustrate the advantages of the cognitive perspective of 
emotion theory. Medical doctors, through the process of their education, are trained to overcome 
their aversion to bodily fluids, death, and other aspects of the practice of medicine that are generally 
found to be repulsive. This sort of training is necessary because a natural aversion to things such as 
bodily fluids has been documented in psychological studies. Natural aversions such as this play a role 
in the cross-cultural presence of abject affective experiences such as disgust which can be identified 
cross-culturally, though the object of disgust can differ. The horror film industry also provides a 
testament to the existence of the aversion to bodily fluids with its over-used appeal to this brand of 
horror to arouse disgust in audiences through the graphic depiction of vomit, blood, gore, etc. (Creed 
1993: 10).18 Simon Baron-Cohen suggests that, like the aversion to darkness, an over-responsive 
aversion to blood is a phylogenically derived predisposition inherited from ancient man (Baron-
                                                 
18
 Creed’s research into the abject and its role in horror is highly influenced by the work of Julia Kristeva and her 
essay The Powers of Abjections. Also, for more research on disgust and its application in art see The Philosophy 
of Horror, or, Paradoxes of The Heart by Noël Carroll. 
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Cohen 1997: 27). What once served as a survival strategy to avoid deadly conditions, such as 
prolonged exposure in areas where predators are active and infectious agents are present, is 
reinforced as a natural response that doctors are asked to overcome. The social constructionist and 
cognitive theorist proffer frameworks that appreciate the ways in which social practices play an 
influential role in affective experience. While emotions, at their most basic level, entail the 
physiological states through which they are experienced, those physiological states are not solely the 
product of evolutionary processes; there are socially selective forces at work as well. Recall the 
discussion of Cook’s and Mineka’s research in conditioning the fear of Rhesus monkeys. Their 
research demonstrated that while a phylogenic trait can predispose the members of a species to 
develop a fear and aversion to something, social forces are required to tap into that predisposition and 
create within the subject an association between the object and the affective experience of fear and 
aversion. The cognitivist’s framework is more able to realize the complexities of affective experience 
in terms of the social forces that influence and tailor our physiological states both immediately (e.g., 
through the training of medical doctors) and historically (e.g., over thousands of years of socially 
selective forces). Further, compatibilism provides an even more effective take on the social 
constructionist’s approach because compatibilism incorporates a deep appreciation for the interplay 
that is present between emotion’s cognitive and non-cognitive aspects as part of a multifaceted 
system. 
The process of cognitive filtering further complicates the work on the role consciousness 
plays in affective experience. This is due to the ability of cognitive faculties to execute processes 
unconsciously. The division between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotion would be 
rather clear cut if theorists could clearly draw a line of distinction between the role of non-conscious 
processes in cognitive and non-cognitive theories. Cognitive filtering, for instance, allows the mind 
to direct perceptions toward completing a task while blocking out the perception of unrelated events. 
“The Invisible Gorilla” experiment demonstrates the effectiveness of cognitive filtering, though it is 
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most effective when a viewer has never seen the video and is unaware of the fact that while the video 
directs the viewer to count the number of passes made by people in white shirts, the true goal of the 
video is to test whether or not the viewer is aware that a person in a gorilla suit passes through the 
group of people passing basketballs.19 The results of this study show that a majority of people who 
view the video do not notice the person dressed in the gorilla suit passing through the group of 
people passing the basketball—until they are given a second chance to view the video. The 
researchers explain that this is due to a process of cognitive filtering through which the cognitive 
faculties are able to unconsciously filter out seemingly unimportant perceptions (i.e., the person 
dressed in a gorilla suit passing through the busy scene). Thus, while a highly cognitive process is 
taking place, the faculties of cognition exhibit the ability to unconsciously manipulate an agent’s 
experience of her perceptions. 
Evolutionary psychology’s and social constructionism’s theories contrast fundamentally 
regarding the foundation of affective experience. The evolutionary psychologist holds the foundation 
of affective experience to be humanity’s universally shared biology. Social constructionists, in 
contrast, view the seat of affective experience to be the socially developed attributes that uniquely 
define each culture’s specific ecology of emotion. That is to say that while the average individuals of 
each society share the same basic biological toolbox from which to build their unique affective 
experience, human experience takes on its emotional facet proper, only after social forces have used 
an individual’s biological toolbox to create her culturally-unique affective experience. 
 
5. Affective Feedback Looping – Applying Hacking’s Looping Effect 
 
In a 1995 publication, Ian Hacking introduced the idea of the looping effect of human kinds: 
“people classified in a certain way tend to conform to or grow into the ways that they are described” 
                                                 
19
 “The Invisible Gorilla” video experiment was produced by Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons and is 
available for viewing here: http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/gorilla_experiment.html 
Thank you to Ann Cudd for the idea to include a short discussion of this experiment. 
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(21). This idea is based in part on the observation that human beings are self-conscious, and this 
capacity brings about instances in which people’s ideas about themselves both individually and as a 
people tend to influence multiple aspects of their lives (Hacking 1999: 59). As was explained in 
section 3.2.2, an instance of this is the occurrence of sexual dimorphism among human populations. 
Where one sex, the male sex for example, is culturally assumed to take a more active role in hunting, 
the beliefs regarding the role of each sex in this society select for stronger and more durable 
physiological construction in the society’s male population. At the same time the evolutionary forces 
of natural selection act as a reinforcement of the given social structure in which it has been 
determined that one sex is to be the hunter. This reinforcement occurs when a society’s potential to 
thrive is supported when healthier and more capable hunting genes are selected for within the males 
of that society.  Thus, over many years, the body types of the sexes within a culture diverge, one 
becoming larger, on average, than the other. Through the looping effect, then, the beliefs of a given 
group of people influence the selective adaptations for that group, i.e., sexual reproduction within the 
group is highly influenced by the people’s desires for members of the opposite sex who exhibit the 
culturally accepted body types—types that were naturally selected for due to the survival and 
reproductive benefits associated with them—in which the men have larger body types and the 
women have smaller body types. This in turn completes the loop when the increased dimorphism 
between sexes becomes a social expectation and, once again, continues its influence on the 
evolutionary selective progress of the population. 
Hacking’s looping effect of human kinds is a member of a subgroup of a larger class of 
feedback loops. The looping effect of human kinds and the members of the larger group of feedback 
loops share a commonality in that looping systems are characterized by a self-perpetuating nature. 
Further, self-perpetuation within looping effects is carried out by two or more aspects of a given 
system’s systematic processes. For example, looping effects are found around us in many different 
capacities. Instances of looping range from the relationship between predator and prey populations 
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which inversely influence each other, to blood clotting which exhibits a positive feedback loop as 
each newly accumulated platelet releases chemicals which further stimulate the accumulation of even 
more platelets until a complete clot is formed. These illustrations show that a system exhibits a 
looping effect when that system reinforces and reiterates a particular process. 
Theories of emotion are also capable of explaining the ways in which social and biological 
processes have a reciprocal relationship within a looping effect of affective processes. For instance, 
the biological mechanisms of affective experience detailed by Prinz are evidenced by the in-depth 
studies of the ways in which some affective processes are produced prior to a person’s associated 
cognitive processes being stimulated.20  
In turn, the anthropological studies of Lutz illustrate that a person’s affective experience is 
influenced by the social aspects of human experience to the extent that specific iterations of affective 
experience in one culture cannot necessarily be transposed on the affective experiences of members 
of a different culture. This is because, for social constructionism, affective experience is so highly 
refined by social interaction that the experience of those emotions can never  be fully appreciated 
without an emotional upbringing in that culture. The emotional ecology of any given culture is too 
complex to be fully appreciated by any non-native of that culture. Thus, emotional experience cannot 
be completely understood as mere bodily processes because in many ways, emotions are 
foundationally influenced by an agent’s cultural beliefs and practices which can include cognitive 
and/or non-cognitive socially based processes.21  
The stark division between the non-cognitive and social-constructionist theories of emotion 
can be bridged using the concept of a feedback loop. Utilizing an understanding of the way in which 
                                                 
20
 Recall the discussion in section 3.1.2 of the cognitive and non-cognitive processes involved in reflexive affective 
experiences, e.g., the way in which an agent may experience fear upon perceiving an unexpected snake-like 
figure. 
 
21
 As was mentioned in section 3.2, social constructionism need not be strictly cognitive, because many of the 
processes which govern social interaction are not self-aware. Thus, social constructionism can be viewed as 
incorporating components from both cognitive and non-cognitive frameworks. 
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affective feedback loops influence affective experience allows for a synthesis of the cognitive and 
non-cognitive theories to occur on a level not realized by the theories discussed in this Thesis. An 
affective feedback loop occurs, for example, when a particular cognitive judgment or social belief 
that x is disgusting influences the selection for innate biological processes which dispose an 
individual to avoid x and this avoidance increases the reproductive fitness of the individuals that 
adhere to the belief that x should be avoided. As the genes and behaviors related to the avoidance of 
and disgust at x are passed onto posterity through social interaction and conditioning the genetic 
factors reinforce the particular social beliefs which first selected for them, and the affective 
experience is mutually influenced by both.22 A specific example of this process is related to the 
earlier discussion of the aversion to blood and other bodily fluids. While an aversion to blood is not 
realized within an individual from birth, millennia of naturally selective forces have predisposed 
humans to be quickly conditioned to this type of aversion. Evolutionary psychologists, like Baron-
Cohen, suggest that the evolutionary force of this looping effect is driven by the fact that creatures 
that avoid blood and other bodily fluids are less likely to be exposed to potentially deadly bacteria 
and other biohazardous contaminants common at scenes in which large amounts of blood and other 
bodily fluids are present (e.g., scenes of decomposing carcasses). Further, the social forces fulfill 
their role as the older generations of a society demonstrate aversions to blood and other bodily fluids 
and thus provide younger generations with the illustrative conditioning experiences necessary to 
activate their phylogenic predispositions to develop an aversion to these abject scenes.23 
                                                 
22
 Recall, for example, Mineka’s and Cook’s research which showed the necessity of social conditioning being 
associated with an “innate” predisposition to fear snake-like objects in order for that fear to be exhibited by a 
given monkey (see section 3.1.2). 
 
23
 The question might arise as to where the original phylogenic predisposition for the aversion to blood and other 
bodily fluids might have come from. The answer lies in the process of natural selection which is driven forward 
by the selection for and against random mutations. Where one ancient creature’s genetic code may have randomly 
generated a predisposition to be attracted to scenes of decomposing carcasses, another creature of that species may 
have a genetic code randomly predisposed to avert them from such scenes. As the course of natural selection takes 
it toll, if one of the predispositions plays a favorable role in its species’ survival and reproductive abilities, given 
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The attempts of both the cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotion to understand the 
foundation of emotion as issuing from one particular facet of the capacities characteristic of human 
beings hinder the ability of each framework to create a potentially more robust understanding of 
affective experience. Constructing a more complete theoretical framework from each perspective is 
beneficial because both theories of emotion provide such a focused framework that they are forced to 
distort the opposite theory’s account in order to accommodate the entirety of human affective 
experience. That is why I argue that more compatibilistic theories of emotion, such as those 
presented by Nussbaum and Robinson, provide the more effective framework from which to 
understand the affective experience of human beings more completely. The incorporation of the 
theory of affective feedback looping, I hold, improves a theory of emotion’s ability to more 
completely appreciate the immense influence that both social and evolutionary forces have on human 
affective experience and each other without the necessity of reducing either force into a process 
embodied by its counterpart (i.e., social forces need not be explained by reducing them to 
evolutionary processes and vice versa). The theory of affective feedback looping is an effective way 
to show the shortcomings of the theories on each side of the cognitive vs. non-cognitive debate and 
further support compatibilist theories which work to incorporate both aspects of humans’ affective 
experience. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Human affective experience mirrors the other aspects of the human condition in that it is 
comprised of a multi-faceted intersection of both biological and social forces. The boundary between 
people’s cognitive and non-cognitive processes is clouded by the ways in which those facets of the 
human experience can be both conscious and unconscious. However, by carefully defining what I 
                                                                                                                                                             
its unique environmental and social pressures, that genetic predisposition will be selected for while the other 
predisposition will be selected against. 
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mean in reference to the categories of cognitivism and non-cognitivism, I present the argument that 
cognitive and non-cognitive theories each provide accurate, yet partial, theories to explain human 
affective experience. This is because the exclusivity exhibited by each framework hinders its ability 
to fully appreciate the aspect of affective experience emphasized by the other. That is, non-
cognitivist approaches like that of evolutionary psychologists may initially seem prepared to make 
accommodations for some of the ways in which affective experience is influenced by social forces. 
However, the evolutionary psychologist’s approach is hindered in its inability to explain some of 
nuances of affective experience that are more fully addressed by social constructionism. Conversely, 
the work of cognitivists like those working on social constructionist theories in the anthropological 
fields, are very capable of presenting theories of emotion based upon intricate examinations of the 
influence of social forces throughout a people’s history. Yet, this camp is subject to overlooking the 
facets of understanding that can be developed in a theory through an examination of the natural 
forces that select for certain evolutionary tools and establish predispositions for particular affective 
experiences within a people. Therefore, each side of the cognitivist / non-cognitivist divide is 
prepared to develop theories which lack certain considerations that the other side is specialized in.  
 A move towards compatibilism offers the potential for developing theories which more 
robustly conceptualize human affective experience. I have argued that both Nussbaum’s and 
Robinson’s theories embody this move towards compatibilism and that the concept of affective 
feedback looping, provides an illustrative example of how the compatibilist’s hybrid account of 
affective experience is superior because it more fully integrates the current data on the study of 
emotion from both sides of the cognitivism / non-cognitivism divide.  
The concept of affective feedback looping detailed in this thesis is aimed at offering a way 
compatibilist theories might be strengthened by providing them with a way to test whether or not a 
given theory of emotion is able to account for the multifaceted way in which emotion is influenced 
by both evolutionary and social forces. Emotion is a dynamic aspect of humankind’s affective 
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experience, and it is essential for any theory aiming at a comprehensive account of human affective 
experience to be compatible with both the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of human emotion. 
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